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I. INTRODUCTION
For the average consumer, the purchase of a product seldom involves
questions of insurance law. When purchasing tangible goods such as washers,
dryers, and automobiles, consumers often rely upon product warranties by the
seller to guard against possible future repair costs. However, in the past two
decades manufacturers and retailers, especially of automobiles, have intensified
the sale of product guarantees such as extended warranties and service contracts
which lengthen the term of a product's usual guarantee.' Moreover,
independent corporations which neither manufacture nor sell consumer
products have begun to solicit third party service contracts to consumers. Such
service contracts are intended to fulfill the purpose of an extended warranty by
providing either actual repair or replacement or by offering financial
reimbursement for the necessary repair or replacement of consumer products.
Abuse in the sale and performance of product guarantees sold by third parties
has come to the attention of both state and federal regulators. Legislative and
administrative bodies have been concerned that third parties, who neither sell
nor manufacture the guaranteed product, may fail to disclose essential coverage
terms, refuse to cover expenses under the contract, or decline to provide
adequate service for the product guaranteed. 2
The increasing sales of third party product guarantees presents the legal
community with significant issues involving consumer protection and insurance
law. In order to offer insurance agreements, a corporation must possess a
minimum level of assets and create a reserve fund from the insurance premiums
which it collects. Moreover, all individuals who sell insurance policies must be
registered as insurance agents by the state.3 Attaining compliance with
insurance regulations is a costly task and presents an insurmountable hurdle to
success for many entrepreneurs. As a result, many corporations which provide
agreements amounting to product insurance take steps to characterize such
contracts as warranties rather than insurance. The ability to be deemed a
warrantor removes the wrath of the ominous insurance regulator and allows a
I Roger B. May, A Special Background Report on Trends in Industy and Finance-
Service Contracts for Automobiles Grow in Popularity, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1978, at 1.
2 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES 84-108
(1968).
3 OHIO REv. CODE ANNm. § 3905.01 (Anderson 1989).
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product guarantee agreement to be enforceable under the contract and
commercial laws of the state.
As one consumer article has indicated, "[e]xtended warranties are really
insurance policies" and as a result similar policy problems that arise with
insurance contracts face the unwary consumer. 4 It has been estimated that
companies who sell extended warranties and service contracts will spend
between four and fifteen cents of each dollar collected for product service-the
rest is profit.5 As was the problem with insurance companies prior to
regulation, entities which sell product guarantees have no incentive to create a
reserve fund which will cover their contractual obligations should they become
insolvent. 6 The inability to fulfill policy obligations was one of the prime
rationales for instituting insurance regulation decades ago. Many states have
allowed manufacturers and retailers of products to provide extended warranties
under state law. However, third parties who are neither manufacturers nor
retailers have realized the lucrative prospects of selling product guarantees.
In Griffin Systems v. Ohio Department of Insurance,7 the State of Ohio
considered the status of third parties who neither manufacture nor sell
consumer goods, but offer service contracts promising to repair products sold
by others. In a surprising decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that third
parties who were neither the seller nor manufacturer of a product, but who
offered product guarantees covering defects within a product sold by others,
were not engaging in the business of insurance. Rather, the court held that such
corporations were offering warranty agreements. 8
In examining Griffin, this Comment will explore the distinguishing
elements of warranty and insurance agreements and examine the manner in
which service contracts have been previously characterized and rationalized in
Ohio and other jurisdictions. Further, this Comment will suggest that not only
has the Griffin court misconstrued prior case law, but more importantly, the
court has failed to sense the true public policy concerns of consumer protection
that lay at the heart of insurance regulation.
II. PUBLIC POLICY
The insurance industry is subject to significant regulation primarily because
"the whole value of the promise sold to the public by insurers lies in future
4 Who Needs an Extended Warranty?, 56 CONSUMERREP., Jan. 1991, at 21.
5 Id.
618.
7 575 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio 1991).
8 Id. at 807.
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performance." 9 The insurer is liable on the policy only upon the happening of a
fortuitous event. As a result, it becomes difficult for the insured to value the
contract. A private individual's access to information is limited and his
potential for becoming the focus of financial abuse is inflated. The same
dangers arise when third parties attempt to offer guarantee agreements for
consumer products.
A second purpose for insurance regulation is the assurance of solvency.
State insurance laws require a minimum level of financial backing and security
prior to the operation of an insurance enterprise. 10 States have created solvency
guarantee funds from capital which is contributed by insurance companies-the
failure to contribute capital to the solvency guarantee fund often results in the
loss of authorization to undertake insurance business within the state. In
addition to contributing to an insolvency fund, all states require the creation of
a reserve fund consisting of liquid assets by the insurance company to cover
potential liability.11
The idea that providers of third party product guarantees should meet the
same standards as those imposed upon the insurance industry may appear
questionable on its face. However, the requirement is a necessary one. The fact
that durable goods may call for frequent repair and maintenance is enough to
require assurance of performance upon those who sell such product guarantees.
The essence of a guarantee is the ability of the provider to fulfill his promise of
future performance if called upon.
Individuals lack the ability to force third party corporations selling product
guarantees to create reserve funds which would cover potential future
obligations. As a result, when the guarantor fails to pay or becomes insolvent,
the consumer's choice is to seek legal damages for breach of contract or in the
alternative, to seek recovery in bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor against the
estate of the insolvent product guarantor.
The inability to check the financial backing of such guarantors forces
consumers to embrace the caveat emptor line of reasoning with little
alternative. All purchasers of third party guarantees are forced to investigate the
background and status of the corporation offering the guarantee. Unfortunately,
when a corporation is not required to file financial statements the ability to
determine its true economic health becomes nearly impossible-especially if the
enterprise is closely held.
9 ALBERT H. MOWBRAY ET AL., INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACrICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 517 (6th ed. 1969).
10 See generally Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471, 480-82
(1961).
11 Id. at 481-82.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Insurance Contracts-The Distinguishing Characteristics
Not all jurisdictions have adopted a statutory definition of insurance. 12 In
determining the distinguishing elements of insurance several jurisdictions have
adopted the test promulgated by Professor Vance in 1951.13 Professor Vance
proposes five elements necessary to constitute an insurance agreement: 1) the
insurer must assume an insurable risk; 2) the insured must be subject to loss
through the destruction or impairment of that interest by the happening of some
designated peril; 3) the insurer must assume the risk of loss; 4) the assumption
of risk must be part of a general scheme to distribute the actual losses among a
large group of persons bearing similar risks; 5) the insured must pay a
premium as consideration of the promise.14 The Vance definition of insurance
has failed to create any bright line test and courts have utilized it merely to
point themselves in the right direction.
In the seminal case of Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 15 the Ohio
Supreme Court established a judicial definition of insurance. The Duffy court
held that an agreement to indemnify "against loss or damage resulting from
perils outside of, and unrelated to defects in [an] article itself' was insurance. 16
This particular definition limits the application of insurance to "perils" which
are not related to manufacturing defects within the product. The Duffy
definition of insurance appears to turn upon the magnitude of risk assumed by
the insurer. The fact that an insurer agrees to indemnify the insured against a
fortuitous event, that is, a loss resulting from an event over which the insurer
has little or no control, has been a strong factor creating a presumption for the
existence of an insurance contract. 17
12 Ohio is one example of a state which has failed to adopt a legislative definition of
insurance.
13 WILLIAMR. VANCE, HANDBOOKONTHELAWOFNSURANE 1-2 (3d ed. 1951).
14 Id.
15 16 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio 1938).
16 Id. (syllabus at para. 3); see also 44 CJ.S. Insurance § 1(b) (1945) (citing Duff);
Meyers v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 69 P.2d 868, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937),
rev'd on other grounds, 77 P.2d 1084 (Cal. 1938) ("insurance is a contract whereby one
undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent
or unknown event"); In re Hilpert's Estate, 300 N.Y.S. 886, 890 (Surr. Ct. 1937)
(insurance held to be "a simple contract whereby the insurer in return for a stated
consideration agreed, upon the happening of a specified event to pay the insured a fixed or
ascertainable sum of money").
17 N.Y. INS. LAw§ 1101(a) (McKinney 1985).
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The magnitude of risk assumed within an agreement is one element which
distinguishes insurance from warranty contracts;18 however, it should not be
the sole factor in characterizing a product guarantee agreement. A California
court has held that the objective of a contract should also be evaluated in order
to determine the character of the agreement. 19 If the intent of a contract is
merely to financially indemnify, that is, to make whole the victim of a loss in
whole or in part by payment and nothing more, then the agreement raises a
presumption of insurance character.20
B. Warranty Contracts-The Buyer -Seller Privity Requirement
Courts have typically held that a warranty may arise only from a contract
of sale21 and the lack of a sale will exclude the existence of an express
warranty.22 Prior to Griffin, the Supreme Court of Ohio had defined an express
warranty as "an affirmation of fact by the seller of a product.., to induce the
purchase thereof and on which affirmation the buyer relies in making the
purchase."23 Moreover, under federal law a written warranty is specifically
defined as "any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer."24
The existence of a buyer-seller relationship has been deemed crucial to the
creation of an express product warranty agreement.25 This relationship, or
privity of contract, has been waived as a prerequisite to warranty claims only
where such a requirement would produce a disastrous impact upon the public.
For example, privity requirements have been exempted from strict product
liability claims. The waiver of strict privity requirements for warranty
agreements has become popular as an effective method of consumer protection,
allowing parties who are not purchasers of the product but may be reasonably
expected to use the product, to bring a claim against the manufacturer or
retailer of a product if injury should occur.26 However, as applied by the
18 Robert M. Kane, The Service Contract and Product Service Warranty as an
Insurance Contract, N.Y. ST. B.J., OcT. 1989, at 46, 48.
19 Transportation Guarantee v. Jellins, 174 P.2d 625, 628-29 (Cal. 1946).
2 0 BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 769 (6th ed. 1990).
21 See 77 C.J.S. Sales § 302(b) (1952).
22 See Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 65 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Mass. 1946); see also
F.M. Sibley Lumber Co. v. Schultz, 297 N.W. 243 (Mich. 1941); G. Van Ingen,
Annotation, Law of Sales and Liability in Respect Thereof as Applied to Transactions in Self-
Service Stores, 163 A.L.R. 238 (1946).
23 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ohio 1958) (emphasis
added).
24 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
25 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (1990).
26 Id.
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Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and numerous strict liability holdings,
a waiver of buyer-seller privity should be the exception rather than the rule in
determining whether a warranty agreement exists. 27 It is not difficult to
understand the rationale behind a buyer-seller privity requirement in warranty
contracts. One of the themes which appear in opinions requiring the existence
of a buyer-seller privity is that a warranty agreement should not be permitted to
indemnify against fortuitous events28 arising from the promisor's lack of
control29 over the product covered under warranty. 30
The idea that product warranty contracts must be part of the basis of the
bargain between buyer and seller has been a key factor considered by many
courts in distinguishing contracts of insurance from those of warranty. 31 If an
agreement to repair, maintain, or to financially reimburse such costs is part and
parcel to the sale of the product itself and promotes consumer confidence, the
agreement is likely to be deemed incidental to the sale of the product and thus a
warranty. 32 However, when separate consideration is required for such an
indemnity agreement, many jurisdictions have found the contract to be beyond
the scope of a true warranty.33 As an Official Comment to the U.C.C. states,
"'Express' warranties rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain." 34
With warranty agreements, the focus has generally been placed upon whether
the warranty was a dickered term in the contract for the sale of a product to the
consumer. It becomes clear that a product guarantee agreement between parties
2 7 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at
690-91 (5th ed. 1984).
28 The relevant New York statute states that a "'fortuitous event' means any occurence
or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent
beyond the control of either party." N.Y. INS. LAW § 1 101(a)(2) (McKinney 1985).
29 The New York laws have assessed the degree of fortuitity found in contracts of
warranty upon the ability of the provider of the warranty to inspect or adjust the object
under warranty so as to exclude chance happenings as much as possible. See 1957 N.Y.
Rep. Att'y Gen. 221, 222; see also Electronic Realty Assocs. v. Lennon, 404 N.Y.S.2d
283, 287 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
30 The "fortuitous events" test has been modified in several jurisdictions and may now
be more appropriately referred to as a "service-indemnity" distinction. See infra notes 100-
19 and accompanying text.
31 77 C.J.S. Sales § 302(b) (1945); FTC Rules, Regulations, Statements and
Interpretations Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. § 700.11(b) (1992);
see also Guaranteed Warranty Corp. v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 533 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1975).
32 See Hmphrey, 533 P.2d at 87; State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 35
N.E.2d 437 (Ohio 1941); see also U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1990); 12 Kan. Op. Att'y Gen. 78-68
(1978).
33 See Humphrey, 533 P.2d at 90 (citing U.C.C. § 2-229 (Warranty of Title), § 2-321
(Implied Warranty - Merchantability), § 2-330 (Express Warranties)).
34 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1.
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which lack buyer-seller privity and wherein the agreement is limited in scope of
liability to the repair, replacement, or reimbursement of such costs resulting
from damages arising only from product defects, the agreement does not
necessarily meet either the definitions of insurance or warranty. Such an
agreement could not unequivocally be characterized as an insurance contract
because the scope of the risk assumed under the contract is limited to
unfortuitous events (defects inherent in the product); and further, the agreement
could not clearly be labeled a warranty as no buyer-seller privity of contract
exists between the parties. This gap has been recognized by the federal
government which has promulgated specific regulations for such agreements
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.3 5
C. Federal Regulation and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson-Moss legislation was enacted with the intent to protect
consumers from abusive and unfair warranty agreements. 36 By the 1970s, it
was evident to Congress that many warrantors failed to properly disclose
essential and key terms of coverage within warranty agreements. As a
consumer protection device, the Act places a disclosure requirement upon all
sellers who provide warranties.37 Further, the Act bars any unfair limitations
and qualifications upon the warranty coverage provided by the seller; in so
doing, the Act attempts to increase the bargaining power of the consumer
relative to that of the warrantor.38
The Magnuson-Moss Act imposes strict standards upon warrantors. 39
However, the Act fails to provide an equivalent comprehensive regulatory
scheme for product guarantees provided by third parties. Under Magnuson-
Moss, the third party providers of product guarantees are not expressly
prohibited from placing harsh restrictions or requirements upon the consumer,
whereas warranty consumers are explicitly protected from these types of
abusive policy limitations. 40
Under authority of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Federal Trade
Commission 4' has deemed a "service contract" as one which would meet the
35 15 U.S.C § 2301 (1988).
36 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1988).
37 Id. § 2302.
38 Kathleen F. Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act-An Analysis of the Efficacy of
Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consuner Protection Tool, 18 SAWTA CLARA L. REV. 73,
80 (1978); 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1988).
39 15 U.S.C §§ 2302-04 (1988).
40 Id.
41 FrC Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations Under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. § 700.11(c) (1992).
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definition of a warranty42 but for the agreement's failure to satisfy the basis of
the bargain test. 43 Such service contracts are subject to Magnuson-Moss only if
they are not regulated as insurance under state law and only if the agreement is
adjudicated as lacking the requirements of a warranty. As a result, there is no
federal preemption in the regulation of service contracts. State law must first
determine the character of the agreement before Magnuson-Moss is triggered. 44
However, even when Magnuson-Moss is applicable, the requirements placed
upon service contracts are not as comprehensive as those placed upon warranty
agreements. The pragmatic result is that once a third party guarantee is deemed
not to be an insurance agreement, Magnuson-Moss may label the agreement as
a service contract.45
IV. GR1FFIN SYSTEMS, INC. V. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
A. The Facts
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of characterizing a
third party product guarantee as either an insurance agreement or a warranty
contract. Upon the receipt of numerous complaints, the Ohio Department of
Insurance ("ODI") began to investigate the activities of Griffin Systems, Inc.
("Griffin") and the Vehicle Protection Plans which Griffin was offering to new
car owners. The ODI had received notice that Griffin was failing to pay its
obligations under the agreements which it had issued to vehicle owners.
Research by ODI revealed that Griffin neither sold nor manufactured any of the
vehicles which it guaranteed, nor did it perform the required maintenance and
repair upon the vehicles itself.46 The plan offered by Griffin guaranteed to
replace defective parts in the automobile; any service which the automobile
required must have been obtained from an independent mechanic and the cost
of such service would then be repaid to the automobile owner.47 The Vehicle
42 As defined under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A), (B) (1988).
43 See id. § 2301(8).
44 16 C.F.R. § 700.11(a) (1992).
45 See generally 16 C.F.R. § 700.11 (the regulations put forward by the Federal Trade
Commission imply that a service contract not regulated by the state as insurance must meet,
at a minimum, the regulations imposed by Magnuson-Moss).
46 The term "guarantee" will be used in referring to Griffin's Vehicle Protection Plan.
This will allow us to avoid the labeling of the agreement as either a warranty or insurance
contract prior to a full analysis.
47 Griffin Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., No. 89AP-608, 1990 WL 80654 at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 1990).
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Protection Plan specifically excluded liability for acts of God and any failure by
the consumer to perform maintenance as required by the vehicle's manual. 48
The ODI conducted a review of Griffin and found the product guarantee
agreements offered by Griffin to constitute insurance rather than warranty
agreements based upon Griffin's lack of buyer-seller privity with the
consumers. 49 The Ohio trial court reversed this administrative finding by ODI
and found, as a matter of law, that the contract was a warranty agreement due
to the limited risk assumed by Griffin. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the contract was properly regulated as insurance under
state law.50
B. An Analysis of the Griffin Decision
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals
and held the Griffin Plan to constitute a warranty agreement. The court
reviewed its holdings in both State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co.51
and State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co.52 and held that as to consumer
goods, an insurance contract "is one that promises to cover losses or damages
over and above, or unrelated to, defects within the product itself. "53
In reviewing the agreement offered by Griffin, the court was satisfied that
losses unrelated to the defects within the product itself were excluded from the
coverage which Griffin provided, and thus deemed the contract to be a
warranty pursuant to both the Duffy and Herbert holdings.54 The ODI
unsuccessfully argued that the failure of a buyer-seller privity should disqualify
the Griffin agreements as warranties. Specifically, ODI pointed to Griffin's
status as a third party product guarantor and argued that Griffin's product
guarantee agreement did not induce the purchase of the products in question.55
The majority was unpersuaded by the distinctions which ODI had presented. In
fact, the court implied that the lack of a buyer-seller privity was of no
significance by stating that "the distinction made in this vein was of no
apparent consequence in Duffy. . . . inasmuch [sic] as it was the seller of the
4 8 Id. at*3.
49 Id. at *1; see also Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3905.42 (Anderson 1989).
50 Griffin Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., No. 89AP-608, 1990 WL 80654 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 14, 1990); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3905.42 (Baldwin 1991).
51 16 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio 1938).
52 35 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio 1941).
53 Griffin Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 575 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ohio 1991).
54 1d. at 807.
55 Id.
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product therein who issued the 'warranty' that this court found to be a contract
substantially amounting to insurance." 56 The Griffin majority went on to hold:
Under the rule of law announced in both Duffy and Herbert, it is clear that
warranties that cover only defects within the product itself are properly
characterized as warranties (as was the case in Herbert . . .), whereas
warranties promising to cover damages or losses unrelated to defects within the
product itself are, by definition, contracts substantially amounting to insurance
(as was the case in Duffy ... ).57
The court labeled this rationale as the "substance-of-the-contract" test.5 8
The court's reasoning for rejecting the buyer-seller privity requirement for
warranty agreements is arguably misplaced. The majority holds that in today's
markets consumers are not persuaded to buy a product based upon the
availability of an extended warranty agreement which may be purchased at
additional cost. 59 Further, the court implies that it would be unfair to permit
only manufacturers or sellers of products to offer extended warranties "while
independent third parties would be subject to insurance regulations even if the
[product guarantees offered] specifically excluded losses or damages unrelated
to defects in the product. "60
V. INSURANCE V. WARRANTY-THE WAY rr WAS BEFORE GRIFFIN
The Ohio Supreme Court has often been cited as a leading jurisdiction in
the ongoing struggle to distinguish insurance agreements from warranty
contracts. 61 In Duffy, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an agreement provided
in connection with the sale of tires guaranteeing "against 'blowouts, cuts,
bruises, rimcuts, underinflation, wheels out of alignment, faulty brakes or other
road hazards."' 62 could be regulated as insurance. The Duffy court expressly
held:
[Insurance] is a contract "to indemnify the insured against loss or damage to a
certain property named in the policy, by reason of certain perils to which it
may be exposed .. .
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 808.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Annotation, What Constitutes Insurance, 119 A.L.R. 1241 (1939); see also 44
C..S. Insurance § 1(b) (1945).
62 State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio 1938)
(syllabus at para. 4).
[Vol. 54:537
INSURANCE AND WARRANTYAGREEMENS
A warranty promises indemnity against defects in the article sold, while
insurance indemnifies against loss or damage resulting from perils outside of
anld unrelated to defects in the article itself.63
Duffy did qualify its holding with a rather important distinction. The court
stated that "[tlhe fact that such [a] contract of indemnity is made only with the
purchaser of the indemnitor's product does not relieve the transaction of its
insurance character." 64 This language restricts a seller's ability to provide
overly broad guarantees which indemnify against events unrelated to defects in
the product itself. Duffy thus acknowledges that even where a buyer-seller
privity does exist, a high degree of risk assumed in the guarantee contract by
the seller may result in a contract amounting to insurance. 65 The court in Duffy
thus indicated that the existence of buyer-seller privity alone may not be
enough to escape the clutches of insurance regulation.
The Duffy court's definition of insurance was later applied in Herbert
wherein the Ohio Supreme Court held that an agreement to indemnify a
purchaser of automobile tires for defects which arose solely from imperfections
in the tires themselves was not insurance, but rather a representation to the
purchaser that the product is one of quality.66 This holding in Herbert is in
agreement with the approach taken by the U.C.C. which endorses the view that
when a product guarantee agreement is part and parcel to the sale of the
product and used to induce the sale, such an agreement is to be characterized as
one of warranty.67
In Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co. 68 it was held that an express
warranty was "an affirmation of fact by the seller of a product or commodity to
induce the purchase thereof and on which affirmation the buyer relies in making
the purchase."69 The Rogers definition of warranty conforms to that found in
the federal Magnuson-Moss Act which defines a written warranty as a promise
that "becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer
for purposes other than resale of [the] product."70 In Rogers, it is evident that
Ohio clearly followed the U.C.C. by imposing a buyer-seller privity
63 Id. at 259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64 Id. (emphasis added).
65 Id.
66 State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 35 N.E.2d 437, 438 (Ohio 1941) (syllabus
at para. 5).
67 U.C.C. § 2-312 (Warranty of Title), § 2-313 (Express Warranties), § 2-314
(Implied Warranty - Merchantability), § 2-315 (Implied Warranty - Fitness), § 2-318 (IThird
Party Beneficiaries) (1989).
68 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958).
69 Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
70 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1988).
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requirement for product warranty agreements. 71 The fact that "[a] warranty is
ordinarily an obligation assumed by a seller of goods" 72 has been well received
by courts in an attempt to protect the public from surrendering money in
exchange for worthless product guarantee policies with little or no financial
backing.73 This rationale is supported in Guaranteed Warranty Corp. v. State
of Arizona ex rel. Millard Humphrey74 where an Arizona appellate court held
that a product guarantee agreement, wherein the guarantor neither sold nor
manufactured television picture tubes, but had agreed to replace defective tubes
upon payment of an annual premium, rose to the level of insurance since no
buyer-seller privity existed between the consumer and the guarantor. 75
In Griffin Systems, Inc. v. Washburn,76 a consumer indemnity agreement
offered by Griffin and substantially similar to that offered in Ohio, was
reviewed by an Illinois appellate court in an attempt to characterize the contract
as either one of warranty or insurance. The Washburn court held that Griffin
did not achieve the status of warrantor because it did not manufacture or sell
the automobile parts which it agreed to repair or replace.77 The foregoing
holdings support the proposition that a third party product guarantor is to be
characterized as an insurer when the guarantor has no buyer-seller privity of
contract with the consumer, and when the guarantor did not enter into the
product guarantee agreement as a basis of bargain for the sale of the goods
protected.
In an attempt to foster a more refined distinction between insurance and
warranty agreements, several jurisdictions have distinguished the two terms
based upon the contractual intent of the guarantor. In attempting to determine if
a product guarantee contract rises to the level of insurance, the California
Supreme Court in Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jellins78 held that in
"looking at the [agreement] as a whole, [if] 'service' rather than 'indemnity' is
its principal object" 79 the agreement is not one of insurance. Specifically, the
Jellins court held that a third party product guarantee contract promising
automobile repair was not an insurance agreement where the guarantor's intent
was to service the product. 80 The service contract in Jellins required the
guarantor to provide garage space, scheduled maintenance, and to repair the
71 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
72 Mein v. United States Car Testing Co., 184 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
73 State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 35 N.E.2d. 437, 440 (Ohio 1941).
74 533 P.2d 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
75 Id. at 90.
76 505 N.E.2d 1121 (M11. App. Ct. 1987).
77 Id. at 1124.
78 174 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1946).




auto if required. Most importantly, these services were to be performed by the
guarantor.81
Duffy and Jellins present two rationales which seem to merge. Duffy
clarifies that although a small element of risk assumption in a product guarantee
agreement should not alone be controlling in determining the character of such
an agreement, an overwhelming assumption of risk guaranteeing
indemnification of losses resulting even from fortuitous events certainly may
prove dispositive of a contract's insurance character, even when buyer-seller
privity exists between the guarantor and consumer.8 2 The Jelins court appears
to develop the Duffy theme one step further. The holding in Jellins implies that
a product guarantee agreement, wherein the parties lack any buyer-seller privity
of contract and the guarantor offers indemnity for the maintenance, repair, or
replacement of a consumer product, may still elude insurance characterization if
the guarantor's intent was to service the product itself. However, when the true
intent of the product guarantee is to financially indemnify losses by simply
reimbursing the product owner for maintenance, repair, and replacement costs,
the contract should be characterized as one of insurance and regulated under
state insurance law. 83 As a result, Jelins closes the definitional gap between
insurance and warranty contracts by allowing guarantors who perform service
in connection with a product guarantee agreement to be treated as warrantors
under state law. If the purpose of the agreement is to repair and maintain the
product, the contract is excluded from insurance regulation. However, if the
agreement merely provides indemnity, or a deep pocket for maintenance,
repair, and replacement undertaken by others, the contract is deemed as one of
insurance. This distinction is referred to as the service-indemnity test.
The service-indemnity test forces courts to draw fine distinctions in
guarantee agreements. In Jim aick Ford, Inc. v. City of Tucson84 an Arizona
court held that a contract which was termed a service contract and provided for
automobile repairs at the guarantor's dealership was an insurance agreement.
The court in Jim Click Ford distinguished its decision from that of the Jellins
court by holding that the Jelins contract provided for garage space, routine
maintenance, and repairs, whereas the Jim aick Ford contract required no
regular maintenance to be performed by the guarantor.8 5 Moreover, Jim aick
Ford held that merely requiring the consumer to produce evidence that the
vehicle had been properly maintained by others, as required by the guarantee
81 Id. at 630-31.
82 State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1938).
83 Jellins, 174 P.2d at 629.
84 739 P.2d 1365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
85 Id. at 1367-68.
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agreement, was not sufficient to create a true service contract. 86 Thus, the
Arizona court based its decision upon the degree of service which the product
guarantor provided. In so holding, the Arizona court emphasized the
requirement that under the service-indemnity test any service performed must
be done by the guarantor. The court refused to expand the definition of
warranty to include agreements which placed the responsibility of product
maintenance and repair upon individuals other than the guarantor itself. The
reasoning behind such a holding is based upon the rationale that shifting the
responsibility of maintenance and repair to others reduces the guarantor's
control over the product and thus creates a greater risk under the agreement.
The result in Jim Click Ford was a holding which reached a balance between:
1) the need to exclude coverage of fortuitous events from warranty agreements,
and 2) the necessity of requiring the guarantor to perform a minimum level of
service under the agreement.
VI. ELIMINATING PRiVY REQUREMENTS IN WARRANTY CONTRACTS: A
JUSTIFIED BASIS IN LAw?
The majority's holding in Griffin places much emphasis upon the Duffy and
Herbert decisions in support of its conclusion. However, no reading of Duffy
or Herbert in the fifty year history of those decisions 87 has resulted in a
holding approaching that which the Griffin majority has recently rendered.
Griffin's refusal to acknowledge the significance of a buyer-seller privity in
warranty agreements will undoubtedly have repercussions in the consumer
world.
The belief that Duffy and Herbert intended the existence of a contract of
sale as a prerequisite to a valid warranty agreement has significant support.88
Indeed, the theory that a warranty agreement must become a basis of the
bargain in a contract of sale has been adopted by the U.C.C. and federal
regulations. 89 In establishing the importance of the basis of the bargain
requirement for warranty contracts the federal Magnuson-Moss Act goes so far
as to create the category of 'service contract' by defining such a contract as
86 Id. at 1368; see also Rayos v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 683 S.W.2d 546 (rex. Ct.
App. 1985).87 State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co. was decided in 1938 and State ex rel.
Herbert v. Standard Ol Co. was decided in 1941.
88 See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § l(b) (1945); see also Annotation, supra note 61.
89 U.C.C. § 2-312 (Warranty of Title), § 2-313 (Express Warranties), § 2-314
(Implied Warranty - Merchantability), § 2-315 (Implied Warranty - Fitness), § 2-318 (Third
Party Beneficiaries) (1989); FTC Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations Under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. 700.11 (1992).
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"[a]n agreement which would meet the definition of a written warranty... but
for its failure to satisfy the basis of the bargain test."90
The Griffin court, in its search for a bright line test, has dangerously
expanded the Duffy holding. In Duffy, the court held that even a seller of goods
would be deemed as engaging in the business of insurance if it offered
excessively broad indemnity agreements to its customers. 91 In Griffin, the
majority held that Duffy placed no import upon the status of the parties entering
into warranty contracts. 92 The majority's determination that the lack of a
buyer-seller privity between the parties involved in a guarantee contract is
inconsequential seems to be based upon Justice Matthias' statement in Duffy
that: "[t]he fact that such contract of indemnity is made only with the purchaser
of the indemnitor's product does not relieve the transaction of its insurance
character." 93 The Griffin majority may well have misinterpreted the foregoing
language in Duffy.
When read as a whole, Justice Matthias' preceding statement in Duffy
simply restricts a seller's ability to provide overly broad guarantees which
indemnify against events unrelated to defects in the product itself. The Duffy
opinion does not attempt to convince its reader that the buyer-seller privity
requirement is "inconsequential" in determining the character of a product
guarantee agreement, as the Griffin opinion believes. 94 Moreover, in Duffy
Justice Matthias expressly held that "[i]f the contracts of indemnity involved
here are not violative of the insurance laws, then every company may, in
consideration of the purchase price paid therefor, furnish its product and also
undertake to insure it against all hazards for a specified period." 95
Furthermore, Justice Matthias held that, per state statute: "[a]ny affirmation of
fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if
the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." 96
As a result, Griffin's reasoning that the Duffy court believed the buyer-seller
privity to be inconsequential in determining whether a contract is to be
characterized as one of warranty or insurance seems unfounded. It is unlikely
that the Duffy court intended to extinguish the buyer-seller privity requirement
in warranty agreements. Quite significantly, the Ohio legislature placed much
emphasis upon the relevance of buyer-seller privity in warranty agreements; it
90 16 C.F.R. § 700.11(c) (1992) (emphasis added); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)
(1988).
91 State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1938).
92 Griffin Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 575 N.E.2d 803, 807-08 (Ohio 1991).
93 Duff, 16 N.E.2d at 259.
94 Gniffn, 575 N.E.2d at 807-08.
95 Duffy, 16 N.E.2d at 259 (emphasis added).
96 Id. (emphasis added); O7o GEN. CODE § 8392 (1935).
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would be illogical to believe that Duffy found the legislatively promulgated
definition of warranty inconsequential as to the requirement that a warranty
contract be a promise made by the seller of a product. 97
The decision in Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co. appears to be in accord
with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Herbert v. Standard Oil Co. and
inconsistent with the holding adopted by Justice Sweeney in Griffin v. Ohio
Department of Insurance. Duffy simply reasons that even parties in buyer-seller
privity may be held to have entered into an insurance rather than a warranty
agreement. Clearly, the Duffy court intended to demonstrate that regardless of a
buyer-seller privity relationship, an overwhelming assumption of risk by the
guarantor in a product guarantee agreement may, nonetheless, result in the
characterization of the guarantee agreement as an insurance contract.98 This
rationale is further supported in Herbert wherein Justice Zimmerman held that
the point at which a seller of goods may be deemed to be involved in the
business of insurance is based upon the content of the guarantee contract which
the seller provides. Specifically, the Herbert court opined that warranty
agreements which represent the articles sold to be so well manufactured that
they will give satisfactory service under ordinary use, but which expressly
exclude defects not in the goods themselves, need not be held to constitute
insurance contracts. 99 Herbert did not attempt to inconsequentialize the need
for buyer-seller privity in the characterization of product guarantee agreements,
but rather to emphasize that the scope of coverage within a product guarantee
agreement is a significant factor in characterizing the contract as either one of
warranty or insurance.100
VII. GRIFFIN'S "SUBSTANCE-OF-THE-CONTRACT" TEST: AN INFERIOR
ALTERNATIVE TO THE SERVICE -INDEMNITY DISTINCTION
The Griffin court looked to the substance of coverage promised by the
guarantor in characterizing the agreement as one of warranty. 10 1 This new
substance-of-the-contract 0 2 test was explained by Justice Sweeney in one
sentence: "[W]arranties that cover only defects within the product itself are
properly characterized as warranties (as was the case in Herbert, supra),
whereas warranties promising to cover damages or losses unrelated to defects
97 Orno GEN. CODE § 8392 (1935).
9 8 Duffy, 16 N.E.2d at 259.
99 State ex rel. Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 35 N.E.2d 437, 438 (Ohio 1941)
(syllabus at para. 5).
100 Notably this test has been codified within the New York state insurance code. N.Y.
INS. LAW§ 1101 (McKINNEY 1985); see also Kane, supra note 18, at 48.




within the product itself are, by definition, contracts substantially amounting to
insurance .... "103
The Griffin court, in developing its substance-of-the-contract approach,
cited to Mein v. United States Car Co. as a precursor to its new test. 104 In
Mein the guarantor, who lacked any buyer-seller privity with the consumer,
offered a maintenance contract to repair and maintain the automobile which was
the subject of the agreement.' 0 5 The Mein agreement set forth a list of parts
covered under the scope of the contract and further excluded coverage of all
parts not listed.10 6 However, the guarantor failed to expressly limit its liability
to inherent product defects. Mein specifically held that the guarantee agreement
was "not against defects in any articles sold, but against loss or damage
resulting from perils outside and unrelated to such defects." 107 Thus, the court
found that the guarantor's failure to expressly limit its liability to product
defects was determinative of an insurance agreement. Mein draws significantly
upon the Duffy decision and places emphasis not only upon the terms of the
agreement, but also upon the existence of a buyer-seller privity between the
parties. 10 8 By holding that "[a] warranty is ordinarily an obligation assumed by
a seller of goods . . .[and that] authority has been cited to the effect that there
can be no warranty without a sale" it may be argued that the Mein court
supports a presumption of insurance where the guarantor is neither a seller nor
manufacturer of the product guaranteed.10 9 The Mein decision placed greater
restrictions upon third party guarantors since it strictly held that all liability not
expressly excluded would be assumed to be included within the scope of the
guarantee, regardless of normal or abnormal wear and tear. 110 Griffin has
refused to read Mein in its totality but rather has chosen to address only
language within the case discussing the importance of limiting the product
guarantor's liability to inherent defects within the product. Thus, Griffin has
failed to distinguish language within the Mein holding which supports the
proposition that there "may be no warranty without a sale." 111 Arguably, the
Mein court would have ruled the Griffin Vehicle Protection Plan to be a
contract substantially amounting to insurance.
103 Id. at 807.
104 Id. at 808.
105 Mein v. United States Car Testing Co., 184 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Ohio Ct. App.
1961).
106 Id.
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The holdings in Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jellins and Jim Click
Ford, Inc. v. City of Tucson should have played significant roles in
distinguishing Griffin's product guarantee as either an insurance agreement or a
warranty contract. The courts in Jellins and Jim Cick Ford support the theory
that where the intent of a product guarantee contract is to provide product
service rather than merely reimburse the cost of such service, the guarantor is
not engaged in the business of providing insurance.112 The significant
requirement implied by the two courts was that the guarantor must itself service
or maintain the product rather than delegate such responsibility. 113
The service-indemnity distinction is more plausible than the substance-of-
the-contract test promulgated in Griffin. Griffin's unrealistic substance of the
contract test characterizes product guarantees based predominantly upon the
scope of the risk assumed by the guarantor. Thus, under Griffin, product
guarantee agreements which indemnify inherent product defects are
characterized as contracts of warranty, and guarantees which indemnify costs
associated with product malfunction based upon fortuitous events are labeled as
insurance contracts regardless of the indemnitor's relationship to the
indemnitee.114 It is far more logical to characterize product guarantees as
warranty contracts when the warrantor's intent is to service the product, and to
characterize guarantee agreements as insurance contracts when the guarantor
merely intends to reimburse and indemnify the costs associated with servicing
or replacing the product.1 15 Such is the distinction put forth under the service-
indemnity test.
The idea that the warrantor must provide something more than a pocket-
book to pay for maintenance, repair, or replacement of a product guaranteed is
essential to the service-indemnity distinction. If the requirement to reimburse
the consumer for product maintenance and repair was the only demand of a
warranty agreement the result would be similar to an insurance policy which
simply offers reimbursement upon the happening of fortuitous events. 116 As a
result, the ability of the guarantor to control the occurrence of fortuitous events
should be a key factor in distinguishing agreements of warranty from those of
insurance. 117 The ability of the warrantor to have control over the product, as
typically is the case where the warrantor either manufactures or services the
112 Transportation Guarantee v. Jellins, 174 P.2d 625, 631 (Cal. 1946); Jim Click
Ford, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 739 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
113 Jellins, 174 P.2d at 631; Jim Click Ford, 739 P.2d at 1367-68; State ex rel.
Herbert v. Standard Oil Co., 35 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ohio 1941).114 Griffin Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 575 N.E.2d 803, 807-08 (Ohio 1991).
115 See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(8) (1988); see also FTC Rules, Regulations, Statements and
Interpretations Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 16 C.F.R. § 700.11(c) (1992).
116 See Kane, supra note 18, at 48.
117 N.Y. INs. LAw§ 1101(a) (McKinney 1985).
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product itself, will arguably reduce the risk assumed by the party guaranteeing
the product." 8
The Griffin test has placed significantly all product guarantors within the
reach of warrantor status. With careful contractual drafting, it is possible to
provide indemnity only with respect to defects inherent in the product itself.' 9
It is difficult to discern the court's intent in rejecting the service-indemnity
distinction. It is possible that the court wished to step in the direction of de-
regulation. However, as one may suspect, the price to be paid will undoubtedly
place a heavy burden upon consumers.
An unequivocal requirement of buyer-seller privity for product warranty
contracts would have provided an intelligent move toward the protection of
consumers in the extraneous warranty market. The result of requiring a buyer-
seller privity for warranty agreements permits the consumer to seek protection
behind the seller's manufacturing or retail enterprise. The product guarantor's
enterprise is essentially a security interest upon which the consumer may rely
in purchasing the seller's goods. However, when the guarantee is offered from
a corporation whose assets are mostly liquid, and whose business is
predominantly to provide guarantee agreements, little tangible security exists
for the consumer. The Griffin court has failed to consider the legislature's
desire to regulate the insurance and risk motivated markets. The Ohio Supreme
Court's failure to address public policy issues exemplifies the court's oversight
of legislative intent. Firms marketing product guarantees within Ohio now
possesses the ability to operate what is essentially an unregulated insurance
enterprise, with no requirements for reserves or financial disclosures, as would
be mandated under Ohio insurance law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The need to characterize guarantee agreements as warranty or insurance for
the purpose of regulation has failed to produce a uniformly accepted test. Most
courts which have successfully addressed this definitional problem have never
lost sight of the true policy behind their interpretative task: the protection of
consumers. The service-indemnity test has been one of the most functional
advances in the ongoing struggle to classify third party product guarantees as
either an insurance or warranty agreement.
The Ohio Supreme Court has taken two regressive steps in the struggle to
achieve a definitional balance between insurance and warranty contracts in the
realm of product guarantees. First, Griffin's rejection of the privity of contract
requirement for express warranty agreements permits any who wish to warrant
118 Kane, supra note 18, at 49.
119 Griffin Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 575 N.E.2d 803, 807-08 (Ohio 1991).
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
durable goods to do so. The effective result of such a holding is not difficult to
hypothesize: warrantors with no ability to control their risks in the products
which they warrant and no requirements to maintain liquidity to cover potential
claims will enter the market and provide significant amounts of risk-bearing
agreements which they will not be able to perform. Such a holding directly
opposes the intent of consumer protection legislation.
Second, the Griffin majority has attempted to simplify the definitional
dilemma facing the characterization of product guarantee contracts by holding
that agreements which indemnify for defects in the product itself are not
contracts of insurance. Here the court embraces an unrealiitic assumption: that
indemnification for product defects in our consumer oriented society is not a
significant risk-bearing activity. However, in a technologically advanced
society where repairs or maintenance upon complex products require significant
skill and labor, the potential for large claims becomes a significant risk. Much
like homeowners' insurance contracts which charge a premium for bearing a
potential risk of replacing products which are stolen, the provider of a product
guarantee imposes a fee upon the purchaser of the agreement for bearing
similar potential risk. More importantly, when a corporation such as Griffin,
whose sole business is to provide product guarantees, is held not to engage in
an activity "substantially amounting to insurance," 120 and thus is not required
to retain a reserve fund or to make public its financial status, the simplistic
definition propounded by the Griffin court becomes even more questionable. As
a public policy concern, the fact that many risk-bearing companies lack durable
assets in which a security interest may be taken emphasizes the necessity of
regulation. In Griffin, the provider of the product guarantee lacked durable
assets because the sole activity of the corporation was to solicit risk-bearing
contracts. As a result, a failure by Griffin to maintain solvency places holders
of service contracts in the position of an unsecured creditor. Such were the
dangers that induced the national development of insurance regulatory schemes.
The influx of contracts amounting to insurance within our consumer
society are undoubtedly risk-spreading devices. The Ohio decision in Griffin
has approached the insurance-warranty definitional dilemma and produced a
theoretical answer. However, the court failed to acknowledge the pragmatic
effects of its decision and refused to adhere to the legislative intent behind the
law that it interpreted. The Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Griffin should
place significant pressure upon the Ohio legislature to promulgate a definition
of insurance which will re-embrace the state's regulatory aim of protecting
consumers from unfair, unsecured, and abusive guarantee agreements.
Keyvan Samini
120 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3905.42 (Anderson 1989).
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